Note to users. If you're seeing this message, it means that your browser cannot find this page's style/presentation instructions -- or possibly that you are using a browser that does not support current Web standards. Find out more about why this message is appearing, and what you can do to make your experience of our site the best it can be.

Site Tools

  • AAAS
  • Subscribe
  • Feedback

Site Search

Search Advanced

Science 7 September 1990:
Vol. 249. no. 4973, pp. 1124 - 1128
DOI: 10.1126/science.249.4973.1124
Prev | Table of Contents | Next

Articles

Theories of Bargaining Delays

John Kennan 1 and Robert Wilson 1

1 University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, and the Stanford Business School, Stanford CA 94305-5015

Contract negotiations over wages are sometimes accompanied by strikes; similarly in legal contexts, settlements of damage claims may require lengthy negotiations. These and other costly delays in resolving disputes are the subject of the studies described in this article. Formulations in terms of game theory indicate that procedural features can allow delays, but the main cause may be informational disparities between the parties. Several models are described and related to data about strikes.


THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN CITED BY OTHER ARTICLES:
Ending Economic Sanctions: Audience Costs and Rent-Seeking as Commitment Strategies.
H. Dorussen and J. Mo (2001)
Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, 395-426
   Abstract »    PDF »
The Social Context of Negotiation: Effects of Social Identity and Interpersonal Accountability on Negotiator Decision Making.
R. M. Kramer, P. Pommerenke, and E. Newton (1993)
Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, 633-654
   Abstract »


To Advertise     Find Products

Science. ISSN 0036-8075 (print), 1095-9203 (online)